JUBA – In a stark rebuke to the transitional government’s timeline, the National Parties Alliance (NPA) has declared plans for South Sudan’s first post-independence general elections in December 2026 as dangerously “premature.” The alliance’s dismissal is not merely a political disagreement but a profound warning that the nation’s fragile peace could be shattered by a rushed, procedural vote lacking the necessary foundations for genuine democracy.
The NPA’s statement, issued by Chairman Joseph Nyieth, responds to a recent high-level meeting chaired by President Salva Kiir Mayardit. While that meeting resolved to proceed with elections at the end of the transitional period, the NPA argues this decision ignores the stark reality on the ground. The core contention is that the political, security, and legal architecture required for a credible, legitimate election simply does not exist. This critique strikes at the heart of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which was designed to shepherd the country from war to democracy through a clearly defined, condition-based process.
The Ghost of Postponed Promises
The NPA’s skepticism is rooted in a pattern of unmet deadlines. Elections were originally scheduled for December 2024 under the peace deal. Their postponement was a tacit admission of failure to implement the agreement’s most critical provisions. The NPA notes, with compelling accuracy, that “none of the conditions that necessitated the postponement… have been meaningfully addressed.” These unimplemented pillars include:
• Security Sector Reform: The unification of rival armed forces into a single, professional national army remains incomplete. Without this, the state lacks a monopoly on force, and elections cannot be held in a secure environment free from intimidation.
• Permanent Constitution: South Sudan is still governed by a transitional constitution. A permanent, popularly owned constitution is essential to define the rules of the political game, the structure of government, and the rights of citizens—all foundational for any election.
• National Population Census: No credible census has been conducted since independence. Electoral constituencies are therefore based on outdated or estimated data, guaranteeing disputes over representation and fairness from the outset.
The NPA’s Non-Negotiable Preconditions: A Blueprint for Stability
Moving beyond criticism, the NPA outlines a concrete set of preconditions it deems essential for any credible poll. These are not mere procedural hurdles but the very substance of a functioning social contract:
1. Return and Reintegration: The safe, voluntary return and resettlement of over 2 million refugees and 1.7 million internally displaced persons. Their disenfranchisement would render any election illegitimate and incomplete.
2. Political Space: The restoration of fundamental freedoms—expression, assembly, association—which are currently severely constrained. Opposition parties and civil society cannot campaign, organize, or critique the government without fear.
3. Inclusive National Dialogue & Reconciliation: A genuine process to address the deep-seated grievances and trauma of decades of conflict. Elections held amidst unaddressed communal hatred and political bitterness are a trigger for violence, not a resolution.
4. Engagement with Holdout Groups: Sustained negotiation with armed and political movements operating outside the R-ARCSS. An election that excludes significant armed factions is an invitation for them to disrupt the process.
The Peril of a Procedural Election
The NPA’s most significant warning is that an election held under current conditions would be a “procedural exercise to legitimize the status quo” rather than an expression of the people’s will. This creates a high-risk paradox: an election intended to cement peace could instead delegitimize the state, entrench the power of those controlling the security apparatus, and provide a catalyst for rejected parties to return to arms. The alliance explicitly warns that such a scenario “risks plunging the country into renewed political instability and insecurity,” potentially unraveling the fragile gains of the 2018 agreement.
Who is the NPA? Understanding the Messenger
The weight of this warning is underscored by the NPA’s identity. It is an umbrella body for holdout and marginalized opposition parties that operate outside the main R-ARCSS power-sharing framework. They are not represented in the transitional government of national unity. Their critique, therefore, represents the voices deliberately excluded from the very meeting that set the 2026 date. Ignoring their demands is not just a political snub; it is to ignore a significant segment of the political landscape whose buy-in is crucial for sustainable peace.
The NPA’s statement is ultimately a call for sequencing: peace and democracy-building first, elections second. It argues that the “repeated postponement of elections is a clear indication that the foundations for a democratic transition remain absent.” The path forward, they insist, is not a rushed race to a ballot box but the deliberate, inclusive, and good-faith implementation of the peace deal that South Sudan’s leaders and the international community have already signed. The choice is between a checkbox election that could ignite conflict and a foundational process that could finally build a stable state.