APGA Chairman’s Strategic Pivot: Why Igbo Marginalisation Persists and the Case for Reintegration into Mainstream Nigerian Politics
The Report
In an extensive interview with Romanus Ugwu of Sunday Sun, the National Chairman of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), Sly Ezeokenwa, laid out a stark political calculus for the Igbo South-East. He defended APGA’s decision not to field a presidential candidate for the 2027 elections, instead backing President Bola Tinubu of the All Progressives Congress (APC). Ezeokenwa argued that the party’s alliance with the ruling APC is a strategic necessity, citing the appointment of APGA members to federal positions—Ambassador Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu as a minister and Mr. Mark Okoye Junior as the pioneer Managing Director of the South East Development Commission—as evidence of a working partnership.
Ezeokenwa was unequivocal in his criticism of Peter Obi, the Labour Party presidential candidate and an Anambra native, stating that Obi “left APGA when the party needed him most” and has “consistently taken every step to annihilate the party that made him.” He further predicted that Atiku Abubakar of the African Democratic Congress (ADC), not Obi, would pose the stiffer challenge to President Tinubu, citing the voting strength of the North-East and North-West, which together hold 50 per cent of registered voters.
“It is only a mad person who does the same thing countless times and expects a different result. From 2015, we have been outside the corridors of power in the country, shouting, asking for one appointment or the other… It is time we came out from this isolation, and out of this island of exclusion that we found ourselves.”
He also expressed fears about the 2027 elections, warning against the “dangerous” use of religious and ethnic sentiments, and called for a free and fair electoral process.
WANA Regional Analysis
Ezeokenwa’s interview is far more than a routine party chairman’s defence of a controversial alliance. It represents a fundamental strategic document for understanding the political trajectory of the Igbo South-East within Nigeria’s federal framework, and by extension, the stability of the broader West African region. The chairman’s central thesis—that the South-East’s “politics of isolation or exclusion” is self-inflicted—is a direct challenge to the dominant narrative of systemic marginalisation that has fuelled separatist movements and regional tensions.
From a regional governance perspective, Ezeokenwa’s argument that the Igbo must “reintegrate into mainstream Nigerian politics” is a pragmatic, if controversial, prescription. Historically, the South-East has oscillated between protest politics (as seen in the 2015–2023 period) and coalition-building (as in the First Republic). The chairman’s call to emulate the 2015 APC merger—where a northern candidate (Muhammadu Buhari) partnered with a South-Western bloc (Bola Tinubu) to win power—is a clear signal that APGA is prioritising access to federal patronage over ethnic solidarity. This has immediate implications for the 2027 election cycle: if APGA delivers its Anambra base to Tinubu, it could fracture the Igbo vote, potentially reducing the electoral leverage of the South-East in national bargaining.
The broader implications for the ECOWAS region are significant. Nigeria’s internal political stability is a cornerstone of West African security. The persistent perception of Igbo marginalisation has historically been a driver of secessionist rhetoric, most notably the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement, which has destabilised parts of the South-East and strained Nigeria’s relations with its neighbours. Ezeokenwa’s strategy, if successful, could reduce the political oxygen for such movements by offering a credible path to federal power. However, if the alliance is perceived as a sell-out—especially given the chairman’s harsh dismissal of Peter Obi—it could deepen disillusionment and fuel further radicalisation.
From an economic standpoint, the South-East’s exclusion from the “corridors of power” has tangible costs. The region’s commercial hubs, such as Onitsha and Aba, rely heavily on federal infrastructure and security. Ezeokenwa’s emphasis on the South East Development Commission and ministerial appointments suggests that APGA is betting on transactional gains—federal projects and appointments—over ideological or ethnic representation. This mirrors a broader West African trend where regional parties trade political loyalty for development concessions, a model seen in Ghana’s NDC-NPP competition for Volta Region votes or Côte d’Ivoire’s PDCI-RHDP alliances.
However, the chairman’s analysis contains a critical blind spot: the assumption that the APC will honour its side of the bargain. The history of Nigerian political alliances is littered with broken promises, and the South-East’s numerical weakness (roughly 15 per cent of the national electorate) makes it a junior partner vulnerable to being discarded after the election. If Tinubu wins without needing the Igbo vote, the region could find itself even more marginalised than before.
Finally, Ezeokenwa’s warning about the “dangerous” use of ethnic and religious sentiments is a pointed reference to the 2023 campaign, where Peter Obi’s candidacy mobilised a youth-led, pan-Nigerian movement that transcended ethnic lines. By dismissing Obi as a “son” who abandoned APGA, the chairman is attempting to delegitimise that movement and steer Igbo voters back to a patronage-based politics. This is a high-risk gamble: if the Obi movement retains its momentum, APGA’s alliance with the APC could be seen as a betrayal of the Igbo quest for a presidency, further eroding the party’s already narrow base.
Regional Backdrop
The Igbo question has been a recurring theme in Nigerian politics since the civil war (1967–1970). The South-East’s relative economic dynamism has not translated into proportional political power, a disparity that has fuelled grievances and periodic calls for restructuring. APGA itself was founded in 2002 as a vehicle for Igbo political aspirations, winning Anambra State in 2006 and holding it intermittently since. The party’s current pivot to the APC represents a significant ideological shift, from a regional protest party to a coalition partner. This mirrors a broader West African pattern where ethnic or regional parties often merge into larger national coalitions to access power, as seen in Senegal’s Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition or Ghana’s New Patriotic Party’s alliance with northern factions.
The 2027 election will be a critical test of whether this strategy can reverse the South-East’s political marginalisation or whether it will deepen the region’s sense of exclusion. For West Africa, the outcome will signal whether Nigeria’s federal system can accommodate regional grievances through negotiation or whether centrifugal forces will continue to pull the country—and the region—apart.
Original Reporting By:
Sunday Sun