The Imam of Balalaboihou has returned to the public stage with the Coalition of Forces for the Republic (CFR), a movement launched on Friday, December 5th, aimed at accelerating the end of the Transition.
A new and potentially decisive political force has emerged in Mali’s turbulent landscape. The Coalition of Forces for the Republic (CFR), revealed through an official statement, is not merely another opposition group; it represents a strategic realignment of major figures who have been sidelined during the current military-led transition. Its leadership underscores a profound irony in Malian politics: the coalition is headed by Imam Mahmoud Dicko, the very religious leader whose moral authority and public mobilization were instrumental in creating the conditions for the August 2020 coup that overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. Now, after two years of exile, Dicko positions himself as the primary challenger to the regime he helped bring to power.
This move signals a complete rupture between the transitional authorities and one of their most powerful former allies. Dicko’s spokesperson, economist Étienne Fakaba Sissoko—also in exile in France after imprisonment—frames the struggle as one against “the Bamako regime,” indicating a shift from internal critique to outright opposition. The coalition’s clandestine nature is strategic; by not publicly naming its other key members from civil society and politics, the CFR protects them from immediate reprisal and maintains an element of surprise, suggesting its network may be more extensive within Mali than appearances indicate.
The CFR’s stated objectives are a comprehensive critique of the transition’s trajectory. They call for:
- A return to constitutional order: A direct challenge to the military’s prolonged timeline, which has seen repeated delays to promised elections.
- Protection of populations & restoration of freedoms: An appeal to widespread grievances over persistent insecurity and a shrinking civic space under junta rule.
- An inclusive national dialogue: This is the most controversial plank. The CFR explicitly proposes including jihadist leaders like Iyad Ag Ghaly (JNIM) and Hamadoun Kouffa, as well as secular Tuareg autonomists from groups like the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). This stance is radically different from the junta’s stated policy of unconditional military confrontation and non-negotiation with terrorists, advocating instead for a political solution to the decade-long insurgency.
To achieve these ends, the coalition advocates for tactics of mass mobilization and institutional subversion: civil disobedience, military refusal of “illegitimate” orders, and judicial resistance by magistrates. This represents an escalation from Dicko’s previous political engagement, such as his campaign for a “NO” vote in the 2023 constitutional referendum where he opposed clauses perceived as eroding Mali’s Islamic social fabric and secular state structure.
The central question now is one of potency and reception. Can Dicko, operating from exile, mobilize the same grassroots religious networks that made him a kingmaker in 2020? Will his call for dialogue with jihadists resonate with a war-weary population, or be seen as a bridge too far? The transitional government, led by Colonel Assimi Goïta from the Kati military base, faces a delicate dilemma. Crackdowns could martyr the movement and inflame Dicko’s base, while inaction might allow the coalition to gain momentum. The return of Mahmoud Dicko is not just a personal comeback; it is a seismic event that reopens fundamental debates about Mali’s sovereignty, governance, and the very path to peace, setting the stage for a new phase of political and social contestation.
Keita Idrissa
Source: Le Témoin