A significant discrepancy has emerged in Nigeria’s security narrative as the government attributes a recent wave of mass abductions in north-western and central regions to jihadist organizations Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, security analysts and international monitoring groups directly contradict this assessment, pointing instead to sophisticated criminal networks locally known as “bandits” as the true perpetrators. This divergence represents more than mere semantics—it reflects fundamental disagreements about the nature of Nigeria’s security crisis and has profound implications for developing effective counter-strategies.
The government’s position, articulated by presidential spokesman Sunday Dare, marks the first official attribution of responsibility for these specific kidnappings. “Abundant data – both nationally and internationally – reveals clearly that ISWAP are all over the place. Also, whatever is left of Boko Haram, they are right there,” Dare told the BBC. However, this assertion comes with a notable omission: the government has not presented concrete evidence to substantiate these claims, raising questions about the basis for this assessment.
[[PEAI_MEDIA_X]] The distinction between jihadist groups and criminal bandits matters significantly for understanding Nigeria’s security landscape. Boko Haram and its ISWAP splinter group primarily operate in Nigeria’s north-east, where they maintain territorial control and pursue explicit ideological objectives, including establishing an Islamic caliphate. In contrast, the bandits operating in the north-west and central regions represent a different threat model—decentralized criminal networks primarily motivated by economic gain rather than religious ideology, though their tactics have grown increasingly sophisticated.
The recent kidnapping spree demonstrates the scale and audacity of these operations:
- 17 November – Kebbi State: Attack on Government Girls Comprehensive Secondary School in Maga resulted in 25 abductions and two fatalities. All hostages have since been freed.
- 18 November – Kwara State: Assault on Christ Apostolic Church in Eruku saw 38 worshippers kidnapped and two killed. All captives have been released.
- 21 November – Niger State: Mass abduction at St Mary’s Catholic School in Papiri, where reports indicate over 250 children and 12 staff members were taken, though official figures remain contested.
Security analyst Bulama Bukarti directly challenges the government’s narrative: “I don’t think that’s accurate. There is no ISWAP or Boko Haram cell resident in the north-west. The recent kidnappings, including the mass abductions, were carried out by bandits, not Boko Haram or ISWAP.” This perspective finds support from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an internationally recognized monitoring group that analyzed the three incidents and attributed all to Fulani militia groups operating as bandits.
[[PEAI_MEDIA_X]] ACLED’s analysis reveals complex motivations behind these attacks. The mass abduction at St Mary’s Catholic School “appears to have been partly carried out to spite the government and achieve some political objectives,” while the church attack in Kwara state was described as “part of the Fulani expansionist drive, and as a way to displace the locals from the communities for illegal mining activities.” This pattern of displacing communities for resource control—particularly illegal mining—has emerged as a disturbing trend in bandit operations across multiple states.
The financial dimension of Nigeria’s kidnapping epidemic cannot be overstated. Kidnap for ransom has become a sophisticated criminal enterprise in Nigeria, generating millions of dollars annually. Despite official denials and a legal prohibition against ransom payments, the presidential spokesman’s ambiguous statement—”Whatever processes are involved – kinetic, non-kinetic, negotiations, etc – have been successful”—suggests a more pragmatic approach than the government’s public position acknowledges.
The geographical distinction in kidnapping perpetrators is crucial. While bandits dominate in the north-west and central regions, a separate kidnapping of 13 teenage girls in north-eastern Borno state—Boko Haram’s traditional stronghold—likely represents genuine jihadist activity. This regional specialization underscores the complex, multi-front nature of Nigeria’s security challenges.
The international dimension intensified recently when former US President Donald Trump threatened military intervention if Nigeria “continues to allow the killing of Christians.” However, both Nigerian officials and independent analysts emphasize that members of all faiths suffer equally in this violence. The targeting appears driven by opportunity and economic calculation rather than religious affiliation, with schools, churches, and communities selected based on vulnerability and potential ransom value rather than sectarian motives.
[[PEAI_MEDIA_X]] The government’s insistence on jihadist involvement may reflect several strategic considerations: potentially securing international counter-terrorism support, avoiding acknowledgment of the bandits’ growing sophistication, or simplifying a complex crisis for public consumption. However, misdiagnosing the problem risks ineffective solutions. Counter-insurgency tactics designed for ideological opponents may prove ill-suited against profit-driven criminal networks that thrive in governance vacuums and exploit local grievances.
As President Tinubu promises to rescue remaining captives, the unresolved tension between the government’s narrative and expert assessments raises fundamental questions about Nigeria’s approach to its security crisis. Without accurate diagnosis and transparent acknowledgment of the threat’s true nature, sustainable solutions will remain elusive, leaving vulnerable communities caught between competing narratives and escalating violence.